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RNOISE RECORDS
Smart Contract Security Audit Report · Ver 2.0 · June 16, 2026

Smart Contract Security Audit Report

Report Version: Ver 2.0 RNOISE RECORDS · DREAMVFIA UNION Date: June 16, 2026

The RNOISE RECORDS engineering team commissioned a comprehensive security audit of all core smart contracts deployed on RNOISE Chain and BSC, including the token contract, IDO presale contract, staking contract, and marketplace. The audit covered reentrancy vulnerabilities, arithmetic overflow, access control integrity, and cross-chain bridging safety. No unresolved critical or high-severity vulnerabilities were found; all reported issues have been resolved and re-verified.

AUDIT PASS
All core smart contracts meet production security standards

Audit Scope

In-scope contracts: Token minting & deflationary burn logic (RNSToken.sol), IDO crowdfunding exchange-rate logic (RNSPresale.sol), staking reward calculation (RNSStaking.sol), and decentralized music rights trading engine (BeatMarketplace.sol).

Severity Count Found Status Remediation Notes
Critical 0 No critical vulnerabilities identified.
High 0 No high-severity vulnerabilities identified.
Medium 2 ✓ Fixed USDT decimal precision overflow fix; cross-chain lock reentrancy guard.
Low 4 ✓ Fixed Missing admin event emissions; redundant logic cleanup.

Key Findings & Remediations

1. USDT Decimal Precision Fix (Medium)

Description: In the RNSPresale contract, the presale accepted standard USDT with 6 decimal precision. The initial calculation logic could cause precision loss or minor slippage when converting between 6-decimal USDT and 18-decimal RNS token amounts.

Fix Applied: The exchange rate algorithm was optimized with explicit scalar adjustment. Updated code applies multiplication first before division, completely eliminating any precision-loss risk. Fully verified via Hardhat unit and scenario tests.

2. Reentrancy Protection (Medium)

Description: The BeatMarketplace contract distributed token withdrawal earnings via external calls. If the receiving address was a malicious contract, it could call withdraw() again before balances were decremented, enabling reentrancy.

Fix Applied: Integrated OpenZeppelin ReentrancyGuard and applied nonReentrant modifiers to all withdrawal and settlement functions. Strict Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern now enforced throughout.

Security Checklist

Audited Contract Addresses

Contract Network Address
RNSToken BSC / RNOISE Chain 0x5AF5c6e381E42e2223A6bE20bf1Ba16bB466E150
RNSStaking BSC 0x0E71fF72b17e8c4bedbbd40F428718014b18737A
BeatMarketplace RNOISE Chain 0x1bafA97548141E7D79b6130D669d8d3a8203FbC8
RNSGovernance RNOISE Chain 0x933d9b8f03ce8E991193Cfc0315ab1f624F75B50